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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On its fifty-first session, the International Law Commission (henceforth, 
“ILC”) adopted the Draft Articles on State Responsibility1 (henceforth, 
“Draft Articles”) and submitted them to the General Assembly for 
approval in 2001. The work of the ILC on the Draft Articles took more 
than forty-four years before the Draft Articles reached their final shape. 
During the process of their drafting, several of its special rapporteurs came 
up with different solutions to the various problems at hand. One 
characteristic of the Draft Articles that is especially emblematic of these 
several (and sometimes turbulent) changes during their preparatory period 
was the issue of obligations and responsibilities arising out of a breach of a 
ius cogens norm or -as it was put in the earlier proposals of the Draft 
Articles- obligations arising out of crimes of states.2  
 
The Draft Articles have been the focus of scholarly attention since their 
adoption by the ILC, as well as during the entire drafting period. Part of 
these scholarly contributions are used in this paper in order to explain 
some of the concepts discussed in the Draft Articles themselves; namely, 
those dealing with serious breaches of peremptory norms, the invocation 
of the responsibility of states and the duty to cooperate. But, there has 
been no discussion on the possible consequences that the Draft Articles 
may have, or have had, on other issues of international law dealing with 
similar concepts.  
 
A similar phenomenon has happened with regard to the scholarly 
contributions on universal jurisdiction. There has been a wide discussion 
                                               
* S.J.D. candidate in Comparative Constitutional Law, Central European University 
(Budapest, Hungary); LL.M. in Human Rights, Central European University, BA in 
Law, Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus”, University of “Ss. Cyril and Methodius” 
(Skopje, Macedonia). I would like to thank the Legal Studies Department, both 
professors and colleagues past and present, for giving the opportunity to conduct this 
research and for giving me sound advice when I needed it. I would also like to thank 
and dedicate this article to my parents for their love and support during my years of 
study at home and abroad.  
1 UN General Assembly, Resolution 56/82, 18 Jan. 2002, Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc., A/RES/56/82.  
2 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of its 28th Session, UN Doc., A/31/10.  
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of issues relevant to universal jurisdiction ranging from its legality, its 
limitations in terms of state and individual immunity, its pitfalls3 and its 
futility. However, none have tackled the possibility of using concepts that 
are not closely related to individual criminal responsibility, but that can be 
used in an innovative way to further the reach of universal jurisdiction. It is 
within this gap in the discussion of both fields of international law that I 
want to position my research.   
 
As this paper’s title suggests, I will discuss the responsibilities and 
consequences arising from a serious breach of obligations emanating from 
a peremptory norm in the Draft Articles. I will also discuss the 
implications that this has to international legal issues other than state 
responsibility, more specifically with its implications to universal 
jurisdiction. I will investigate the possibility of whether and how one can 
use a codification that deals with the responsibility of states, to issues that 
regulate the criminal responsibility of individuals. My hypothesis is that 
certain obligations that have been codified in the Draft Articles (like the 
duty to cooperate) have permeated the narrow sphere of state 
responsibility in other fields of international law. These obligations can be 
combined with the peremptory status of the crimes falling under universal 
jurisdiction and can give an argument that states are obliged to: one, bring 
prosecutions against those individuals responsible for international crimes; 
and two, render assistance to each other in order to facilitate such 
prosecutions. 
 
In section II, I will explain the notion of ‘serious breach’ as it is portrayed 
in the Draft Articles and the obligations and consequences that arise from 
it. In section III, I will briefly explain the notion of ‘universal jurisdiction’ 
and the crimes that are covered by it. I will also discuss their peremptory 
status, as well as the nature and consequences of peremptory norms. In 
section IV, I will combine the arguments of these separate spheres of 
international law and discus its implications. I will forward the argument 
that the concept of communitarianism, specifically recognised in the Draft 
Articles and inherent to the concept of ius cogens, gives rise to, if not an 
obligation to prosecute, then at least a strong additional argument in the 
arsenal of the supporters of prosecutions under universal jurisdiction. I will 
also argue that the duty to cooperate in order to bring an end to a breach 
extends to requests of prosecuting states to other states for judicial 
assistance in criminal maters, regardless of bilateral arrangements among 
those states.  
 
                                               
3 H.A. KISSINGER, “The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction”, Foreign Affairs, 2001, 
pp. 86-96. 
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II. SERIOUS BREACHES OF A PEREMPTORY NORM IN THE DRAFT      
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE INCORPORATION    
OF THE COMMUNAL SPIRIT  INTO THE ARTICLES 
 
1.  Overview of the development of the concept of ‘serious breach’ in the Draft 
Articles 
In 2001, the ILC submitted for approval its report on its fifty-first session 
and with it the final Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts to the United Nations General Assembly 
(henceforth, “UNGA”). The Commission’s work of four decades on the 
issue had finally come to an end. The Draft Articles themselves have 
undergone significant changes during the four decades of drafting. The 
whole concept of ‘responsibility of states’ dates back to before the creation 
of the UN and draws its roots from cases of diplomatic protection and the 
sending of diplomatic envoys.4 This concept has emerged in an age of 
bilateralism and most of its rules deal with the invocation of state 
responsibility in situations arising out of bilateral relations; or multilateral 
relations where the consequences of the wrongful acts are limited to one 
or a small number of states. With the emergence of closer ties between 
states and the realisation that certain interests are common and vital to all 
states, the view on the norms governing the issue of state responsibility 
also started to change, reflecting this realisation. 
 
One of the most notable changes in the whole concept of responsibility of 
states was the introduction of the distinction between the concept of 
international crimes of states and international delicts in 1976. This was 
accomplished through the provisional adoption of Article 19 that dealt 
with this issue.5 Article 19 of the 1976 Draft6 tried to incorporate the then 
                                               
4  D. BODANSKY and J. CROOK, “The ILC’s State Responsibility Articles: 
Introduction and Overview”, American Journal of International Law, 2002, pp. 773-791; 
G. NOLTE, “From Dionisio Anzilotti to Roberto Ago: The Classical International 
Law of State Responsibility and the Traditional Primacy of Bilateral Conception of 
Inter-State Relations”, European Journal of International Law, 2002, pp. 1083-1098. 
5 International Law Commission, First report on State Responsibility by James Crawford 
Special Rapporteur on 1 May 1998, UN Doc., A/CN.4/490/Add 1, § 43; for the general 
historical overview of the development of the Draft Articles, see also A. GATTINI, 
“A Return Ticket to ‘Communitarisme’ Please”, European Journal of International Law, 
2002, pp. 1181-1199; E. WYLER, “From ‘State Crime’ to Responsibility for ‘Serious 
Breaches’ of Obligations Under Peremptory Norms of General International Law”, 
European Journal of International Law, 2002, pp. 1147-1160; G. NOLTE, “From 
Dionisio Anzilotti to Roberto Ago”, supra note 4; J. CRAWFORD, “The ILC’s 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: a 
Retrospect”, American Journal of International Law, 2002, pp. 874-890; R. 
ROSENSTOCK, “The ILC and State Responsibility”, American Journal of 
International Law, 2002, pp. 792-797. 
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fresh development of the concept of ius cogens brought on by the adoption 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and especially 
Article 53, where ius cogens is defined. Even as early as 1939, in his Hague 
Academy lectures, the Special Rapporteur Roberto Ago -under whom the 
provisional adoption of Article 19 occurred- had put forward the idea that 
a distinction could be made between state crimes and delicts.7 The idea, for 
Ago, was not to put the focus on the infliction of punishment on the 
responsible state, but on the repressive character of the countermeasures 
that could be used in case of an international crime.8 
 
This suggestion was not well accepted by some states and was opposed 
during the entire drafting history of the Draft Articles, as a concept that 
has no foundation in customary international law in relation to state 
responsibility. 9  Although some states 10  were strong supporters of the 
concept of international crimes of states, the concept was dropped by the 
time of the third and final reading of the Draft Articles. It was replaced by 
the notion of ‘serious breach of a peremptory norm’, which was introduced 
in Articles 40 and 41 of the final Draft Articles. An approach of a single 
type of responsibility of states for the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act was thus put into place and the distinction between crimes 
and delicts -at least when it came to states- became history. Crawford 
himself presented this shift of terminology in the Draft Articles as more 
than just a makeover of the concept of international crimes of states that 
could be used as a means of sneaking that same concept more easily under 
the radar of objector states. On the contrary, this shift was presented as a 
change of concepts that puts more focus on peremptory norms as a better 
established concept of international law than international crimes of 
states.  
 
Regardless of the fact whether the change from international crimes of 
states to serious breaches of peremptory norms is a mere cosmetic change 
or has a wider conceptual meaning,11 there are two important points that I 
want to highlight for our current discussion. The first point is the fact of 
the recognition of special communitarian interests of individual states as 
                                                                                                                                
6  International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its 28th Session, 1976 
[reproduced in ILC Yearbook, 1976, Vol. II, Part I].  
7 G. NOLTE, “From Dionisio Anzilotti to Roberto Ago”, supra note 4, p. 1093.  
8 Ibid.  
9 See International Law Commission, First Report on State Responsibility, supra note 5, § 
52. 
10 Most notably the Nordic countries; see ibid., § 53.  
11 See, for more details, E. WYLER, “From ‘State Crime’ to Responsibility for 
‘Serious Breaches’ of Obligations Under Peremptory Norms of General International 
Law”, supra note 5, pp. 1159-1160.  
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parts of a wider community of states; and second that this recognition has 
not been changed in any of the proposals put forward in the Draft Articles 
since the introduction of the divisions between crimes and delicts in 1976. 
The evolution of the notions of obligations erga omnes specifically 
recognised by the International Court of Justice (henceforth “ICJ”) in the 
Barcelona Traction Case12 and later confirmed in the East Timor Case,13 as 
well as the development of the concept of ius cogens in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention, led to the special recognition of these concepts in the Draft 
Articles.14 This was originally carried out by the introduction of crimes of 
states in Article 19 and later changed to the concept of serious breach.15 I 
will detail what an obligation of erga omnes character entails later in this 
section, while the consequences of ius cogens norms will be discussed more 
broadly in section III.  
 
2. Serious breaches of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general 
international law in the Draft Articles 
As noted previously, Articles 40 and 41 introduce the concept of ‘serious 
breach of a peremptory norm of general international law’ and they state:  
 
“Article 40 - Application of this chapter: 
- This chapter applies to the international responsibility which is 
entailed by a serious breach by a state of an obligation arising under 
a peremptory norm of general international law. 
- A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or 
systematic failure by the responsible state to fulfil the obligation”. 
 
“Article 41 - Particular consequences of a serious breach of an 
obligation under this chapter: 
- States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any 
serious breach within the meaning of Article 40. 
- No state shall recognise as lawful a situation created by a serious 
breach within the meaning of Article 40, nor render aid or 
assistance in maintaining that situation. 
- This article is without prejudice to the other consequences 
referred to in this Part and to such further consequences that a 
breach to which this chapter applies may entail under international 
                                               
12 I.C.J., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited [Belgium v. Spain; 2nd 
Phase], 5 Feb. 1970.  
13 I.C.J., East Timor [Portugal v. Australia], 30 June 1995. 
14 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles Submitted as Part of 
the Report of the International Law Commission on its Fifty First Session, [reproduced in 
ILC Yearbook, 2001, Vol. II, Part II].  
15 Ibid., Part II, Chapter III.  
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law”.16 
 
As we can see from Articles 40 and 41, the Draft Articles deal only with 
serious breaches of obligations that arise under peremptory norms of 
international law. The Commentaries to the Draft Articles do not give a 
specific list or a set of criteria to define either what a peremptory norm is 
or what constitutes a serious breach. A peremptory norm is defined in 
Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a 
“norm of general international law […] accepted and recognised by the 
international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent 
norm of general international law having the same character”.17 The ICJ, 
for example, has found that the use of force contrary to the principles of 
the Charter is a peremptory norm in the Nicaragua Case,18 as well as the 
prohibition of genocide and non-discrimination in the Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo Case.19 Unfortunately, the ICJ has not elaborated 
on a set of criteria for recognition of a norm as achieving the status of ius 
cogens in its case law. The Draft Articles elegantly avoid this issue by 
specifying that they do not deal with substantive rules, but with secondary 
rules of international law. The ILC, nevertheless, gives some examples that 
are already recognised as such, with the emphasis that the examples given 
by no means constitute an exhaustive list.20 
 
Not every breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm gives 
rise to the provisions in Article 40 and 41, but only a serious one. In order 
for a breach to be deemed serious, it has to be considered a “gross or 
systematic failure by the responsible state to fulfil the obligation”.21 The 
breach can either be gross or systematic; it does not require both elements 
to be present.22 For a breach to be regarded as systematic, it has to be 
                                               
16 Ibid., Articles 40 and 41, p. 282.   
17 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53.  
18 I.C.J., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and around Nicaragua [Nicaragua v. US], 
27 June 1986.  
19 I.C.J., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo [DRC v. Rwanda], 3 Feb. 2006, 
§§ 64 and 78.  
20 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 40,  §§ 3-6; see also E. WYLER, From “State Crime” to Responsibility for 
“Serious Breaches” of Obligations Under Peremptory Norms of General 
International Law, supra note 5, pp. 1154-1157. 
21 International Law Commission, 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading, 
Article 40 § 2.  
22 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 40, § 7.  
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carried out in an “organised and deliberate way”.23 The term ‘gross’, on the 
other hand, refers to the intensity of the violation or of its effects.24 
Therefore, the term ‘serious’ denotes that a certain magnitude or scale of 
violations is necessary for it to be deemed a serious breach of an obligation 
arising under peremptory norms. For instance, in relation to the crime of 
torture, although it has attained the status of a peremptory norm, acts of 
torture need to be committed on a wider or systematic scale for them to 
achieve the status of a serious breach. Not every act of torture can bring 
about the type of responsibility envisaged in the Draft Articles. 
Nevertheless, the Commentaries do say that certain acts, by their very 
nature, can only be committed in a gross and systematic manner; 
aggression being the prime example given in the Commentaries.25 
 
Article 41, on the other hand, deals with the specific obligations that other 
states have. By the term ‘other states’, the Draft Articles refer to the 
members of the international community that are neither an injured state, 
nor a responsible state. Article 41’s first obligation is for states to 
“cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach”.26 
Article 41 § 1, therefore, creates a positive obligation on states to 
cooperate in order to facilitate the end of a breach. The Commentaries do 
not specify any special mechanism through which this cooperation should 
take place but they, however, note that this type of cooperation is best 
placed within the mechanisms of the United Nations. 27  The 
Commentaries also do not say what type of measures such cooperation 
should produce, since this will depend on the type of the peremptory norm 
and the type of breach in question.28 What they say is that “it is, however, 
made clear that the obligation to cooperate applies to states whether or 
not they are individually affected by the serious breach; what is called for 
in the face of serious breaches is a joint and coordinated effort by all states 
to counteract the effects of these breaches”.29 
 
The Commentaries do not specifically say that the duty to cooperate is 
                                               
23 Ibid, § 8. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 International Law Commission, 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 21, Article 41 § 1.  
27 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 41, § 2.  
28  See, for more details on the duty to cooperate and Articles 40 and 41, A. 
GATTINI, “A Return Ticket to ‘Communitarisme’ Please”, supra note 5, pp. 1185-
1188; E. WYLER, “From ‘State Crime’ to Responsibility for ‘Serious Breaches’ of 
Obligations Under Peremptory Norms of General International Law”, supra note 5.  
29 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 41, § 3. 
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firmly established in international customary law and say that it may 
reflect a progressive development on the part of the Commission.30 But, as 
Andrea Gattini has argued, the duty to cooperate has been stressed in 
several international documents, including Article 4 (a) of the Declaration 
of Principles on Friendly Relations and Cooperation of States adopted by 
the UNGA. According to the Declaration, states are required to cooperate 
in the maintenance of international peace and security and, in Article 4 (b) 
of the same declaration, for the promotion and respect of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, as well as the elimination of every kind of 
racial discrimination and religious intolerance.31  In his view, the high 
political connotation of the Declaration makes it “apparent that the ILC 
codified rather than developed the obligation to cooperate in bringing the 
violation to an end”.32 
 
A second set of obligations arising from a serious breach is put down in 
Article 41 § 2 and these are: first the duty not to recognise as lawful the 
situation arising from the breach; and second not to render aid or assistance 
in maintaining that situation. The first of these two obligations requires 
that states, as members of the international community, do not recognise 
the situation that arises from the serious breach. A specific example of this 
obligation not to recognise is the non-recognition, neither through formal 
steps nor by specific actions, of the acquisition of a territory from another 
state by the use of force.33 The obligation not to recognise the situation as 
legal also applies to the responsible state and even to the directly injured 
state. This is so because the injury is afflicted to the international 
community as a whole and, consequently, a waiver or recognition by the 
injured state would not preclude the responsibility of the state that is in 
breach.34 The scope of the obligation not to recognise the situation is not 
unqualified and certain limits were put in the ICJ’s advisory opinion 
concerning Namibia (South West Africa):  
 
“The non-recognition of South Africa’s administration of the 
territory should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any 
advantages derived from international cooperation. In particular, 
while official acts performed by the government of South Africa on 
behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the 
mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to 
                                               
30 Ibid.  
31 A. GATTINI, “A Return Ticket to ‘Communitarisme’ Please”, supra note 5, p. 
1186.  
32 Ibid. 
33 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 41, § 5.  
34 Ibid, § 9.   
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those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths 
and marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the 
detriment of the inhabitants of the territory”.35 
 
The obligation not to recognise and especially not to collectively recognise 
the consequences resulting from a serious breach is seen by the ILC as a 
prerequisite for any community response and a minimum necessary 
response by states to such a breach.36 The Namibia (South West Africa) 
opinion and the ILC Commentaries to Article 41 are not very clear as to 
what other situation the obligation not to recognise and its exceptions 
apply. This is also true of its scope and, consequently, a wide margin is left 
to the discretion of the states and to the prevailing situation.37 
 
The second obligation arising from Article 41 § 2 is the duty “not to render 
aid or assistance in maintaining that situation”.38 This obligation deals with 
the question of the response of the other states after the fact of the 
occurrence of the serious breach. This obligation should be read in 
conjunction with Article 16 of the Draft Articles,39  which deals with 
assistance by third states after the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act.40 
 
The obligations not to recognise and not to render aid and assistance seem 
to be two sides of the same coin. The first is a negative obligation not to 
recognise a situation as legal; the second is a positive obligation, i.e., an 
obligation not to take positive steps to maintain the consequences of that 
breach. Again it is important to point out that both the Commentaries 
and the ICJ’s Namibia (South West Africa) opinion do not give more precise 
guidelines on what constitutes aiding and assisting the maintenance of the 
consequences of the breach and leaves it to the specific situation at hand.41 
 
Article 41 § 3 is what the ILC calls a ‘saving clause’, denoting two 
                                               
35 I.C.J., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) [Namibia 
Advisory Opinion], Adv. Op., 21 June 1971, § 125.  
36 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 41, § 8.  
37 See A. GATTINI, “A Return Ticket to ‘Communitarisme’ Please”, supra note 5, 
pp. 1188-1190.  
38 International Law Commission, 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 21, Article 41 § 2.  
39 International Law Commission, 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 21, Article 16, on “aid 
or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act”. 
40 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 41, § 11.  
41 See A. GATTINI, “A Return Ticket to ‘Communitarisme’ Please”, supra note 5, 
pp. 1189-1192.  
21  European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.2 No.1 
 
consequences. First, that the obligations set forth in Article 41 §§ 1 and 2 
do not prejudice the consequences for the responsible state prescribed in 
the other parts of the Draft Articles; namely, the cessation of the breach, 
the continuance of the performance of its obligations, the giving of 
guarantees of non-repetition and the making of reparations in conformity 
with the rules set out in the Draft Articles. 42  Second, that the 
consequences and obligations set out in Article 41 §§ 1 and 2 do not 
prejudice other consequences set out in other rules mainly of a primary 
nature of international law. One example given in the Commentaries is the 
collective response through the United Nations Security Council 
(henceforth, “UNSC”), including the use of force to counteract an act of 
aggression.43 
 
3.  Who can invoke the responsibility of a state? 
 
Part III of the Draft Articles prescribes the implementation of state 
responsibility and it is covered in Articles 42-54. These articles deal with 
issues like: who can invoke state responsibility; what steps do they have to 
follow; how can a state lose its claim; whether countermeasures are 
allowed; who can use them and under what circumstances? One brief note 
before going more deeply into the issue of who can invoke the 
responsibility of a state: one cannot but notice the fact that the Draft 
Articles do not deal with an emerging and growing issue of invoking state 
responsibility by private; non-state actors.44 This can be seen as a missed 
opportunity by the ILC to either codify or bring about a progressive 
development in the field. This is even more obvious when considering the 
fact that a wide number of international tribunals give standing to 
individuals or NGO’s or other private parties and that there are 
international tribunals that also deal with the criminal responsibility of 
individuals.45 In an age where an increasing number of institutions or 
international regimes are becoming or incorporating certain features of 
                                               
42 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 41, § 13.  
43 Ibid, § 14.  
44 See, for an overview of this gap in the Draft Articles, E. BROWN WEISS, 
“Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century”, American Journal of 
International Law, 2002, pp. 798-816.  
45 See, on the proliferation and impact of international tribunals who give standing to 
private parties, L.R. HELFER and A.-M. SLAUGHTER, “Toward a Theory of 
Effective Supranational Adjudication”, Yale Law Journal, 1997, pp. 273-328; L.R. 
HELFER and A.-M. SLAUGHTER, “Why States Create International Tribunals: A 
Response to Professors Posner and Yoo”, California Law Review, 2005, pp. 899-956; 
E.A. POSNER and J.C. YOO, “Judicial Independence in International Tribunals”, 
California Law Review, 2005, pp. 1-74; E.A. POSNER and J. C. YOO, “Reply to 
Helfer and Slaughter”, California Law Review, 2005, pp. 957-973. 
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supranational arrangements,46 it is hardly justifiable not to discuss the 
invoking of state responsibility by private parties.  
 
Regardless of this gap, there is a certain characteristic of Part III of the 
Draft Articles that is of significant importance for this topic; namely, the 
invocation of state responsibility by a state other than the injured state in 
cases of a breach of an obligation erga omnes, set down in Article 48. The 
notion of erga omnes obligations has been established by the ICJ in the 
Barcelona Traction Case where it said:  
 
“In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the 
obligations of a state towards the international community as a 
whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another state in the field of 
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the 
concern of al1 states. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, al1 states can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations erga omnes”.47 
 
The ICJ gave some tentative clues as to where those obligations arise 
from; namely, from the outlawing of aggression and genocide, the 
principles and rules concerning the basic rights and freedoms of the human 
person, the protection against slavery and racial discrimination,48 as well as 
interference with the right of self-determination of peoples.49 
 
I would now like to shortly comment on the links between obligations erga 
omnes and norms of ius cogens. Obligations erga omnes are obligations that are 
owed to every state because every state has an interest in securing that 
obligation. The term ‘erga omnes’ only deals with the issue of obligations 
that one state has towards every other state in the international 
community of states. On the other hand, the term ‘ius cogens’ depicts the 
status that norms have, relative to all other types of norms of international 
law. It can be said that these are similar concepts but looked at from 
different vantage points, one from the point of obligations, the other from 
                                               
46 There are differing interpretations on what a supranational body or system is but 
one of their main traits is the ability to penetrate the surface of the state and be able 
to interact with the different players of the internal legal system of the state; see, for 
more details, L.R. HELFER and A.-M. SLAUGHTER, “Toward a Theory of 
Effective Supranational Adjudication”, supra note 45. 
47 I.C.J., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd, 5 Feb. 1970, § 33.  
48 Ibid, § 34. 
49 I.C.J., East Timor, § 29.  
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the point of hierarchy of norms.50  It is not always clear whether an 
obligation that has an erga omnes character is always a ius cogens norm, but it 
seems that the reverse is almost certainly true; a ius cogens norm will always 
produce obligations erga omnes, due to the underlying values that it 
enshrines.51 
 
The ILC itself had to consider this issue of the interplay between 
obligations erga omnes and norms of ius cogens when deciding on what to 
focus -peremptory norms or obligations erga omnes- when talking about the 
consequences of a breach of a peremptory norm and the issue of who has 
the right to invoke the international responsibility of a state. It came to 
the conclusion that there is no settled answer to whether, when one speaks 
about erga omnes and ius cogens, one is using interchangeable or separate and 
distinct concepts. The ILC put it best when talking about the relation 
between ius cogens and erga omnes by saying:  
 
“Whether or not peremptory norms of general international law and 
obligations to the international community as a whole are aspects of 
a single basic idea, there is at the very least substantial overlap 
between them. The examples which the International Court has 
given of obligations towards the international community as a whole 
all concern obligations which, it is generally accepted, arise under 
peremptory norms of general international law. Likewise the 
examples of peremptory norms given by the Commission in its 
commentary to what became Article 53 of the Vienna Convention 
involve obligations to the international community as a whole. But 
there is at least a difference in emphasis. While peremptory norms 
of general international law focus on the scope and priority to be 
given to a certain number of fundamental obligations, the focus of 
obligations to the international community as a whole is essentially 
on the legal interest of all states in compliance - i.e., in terms of the 
present Articles, in being entitled to invoke the responsibility of any 
state in breach”.52 
 
I would like to stress that for this paper the issues seems to be moot 
considering the fact that the crimes discussed below are universally 
accepted as producing erga omnes obligations, due to the values that 
                                               
50  M.C. BASSIOUNI, “Accountability for International Crime and Serious 
Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: International Crimes, Ius Cogens and 
Obligations Erga Omnes”, Law and Contemporary Problems, 1996, pp. 63-74.  
51 M. RAGAZZI, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2000, pp. 190-210.  
52 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Part II, Chapter III, § 7. 
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international crimes protect.  
 
Article 4853 answers the question of who can invoke the responsibility of a 
state other than the injured state. There are two types of states that fall 
under this category: the first being a group of states to which the 
responsible states owe certain obligations; e.g., a group created by a 
multilateral treaty that is established to protect a particular interest of that 
group of states.54 I will not deal with these types of obligations in this 
paper because they are not a reflection of communitarianism in 
international law, but of a mechanism of protection of interests that are 
particular to a specific group of states that may not be shared by the 
community of states as a whole. The second group of states is comprised 
of all states in the international community because the obligations in 
question are of an erga omnes character; i.e., they are owed to the 
international community as a whole.  
 
The ILC included the provisions of Article 48 § 1 (b) in order to give effect 
to the ICJ’s statement on erga omnes obligations in the Barcelona Traction 
Case. Specifically, it understood that, in obligations that are deemed to be 
of such importance as to be qualified as erga omnes, every state has a legal 
interest in their protection.55 There are no special criteria that a state has 
to meet in order to be able to invoke the responsibility of the state in 
breach, since obligations erga omnes are owed to the international 
community as a whole and every state is a part of that same community.56 
Under the provisions of Article 48 § 2, a state other than the injured state 
has certain prerogatives. Namely, it can call for a cessation of the breach; a 
return to normal behaviour of the responsible state; to request guaranties 
of non-repetition of the act; and, according to subparagraph (b), claim 
reparations. The list given in Article 48 § 2 is exhaustive,57 which means 
that other states do not have the full range of options that injured states 
have when responding to a breach of an obligation.  
 
One important distinction between the options that an injured state has, 
contrary to all other states in terms of responses to an internationally 
wrongful act, is the recourse to countermeasures. Countermeasures are 
acts that would normally be considered as internationally wrongful acts if 
they were not undertaken for the purpose of forcing the responsible state 
                                               
53 International Law Commission, 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 21, Article 48, on 
“invocation of responsibility by a state other than an injured state”. 
54 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 48, §§ 4-5.  
55 Ibid, § 8.  
56 Ibid, § 10. 
57 Ibid, § 12.  
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to cease its wrongful act, to start the procedure of compliance with its 
obligations and to start making the appropriate reparations. 58 
Countermeasures that are taken by other states on behalf of the injured 
state in relation to breaches of obligations erga omnes are called 
countermeasures of general interest or collective countermeasures. The 
reason why countermeasures of general interests are not specifically 
authorised in the Draft Articles is because countermeasures are a legal 
notion commonly associated with self-help and more in private rather than 
public law. They are available to injured states because the institutions of 
the international system have failed and, therefore, it is up to the 
individual state to correct the wrong that has been inflicted upon it. 
Because it is a mechanism of self-help, the concept of collective 
countermeasures inherently relies on the self-assessment of the injured 
party to decide whether an internationally wrongful act has been 
performed. A further reason why the ILC did not want to specifically put 
countermeasures of general interest in the Draft Articles is the fact that 
the ILC itself was afraid that countermeasures of general interest would 
open the door to international vigilantism.59 
 
But this is not the whole story. Staying in the field of countermeasures, the 
ILC, in Article 54, decided to put another savings clause by saying that the 
chapter dealing with countermeasures and the lack of inclusion of 
countermeasures of general interests does not prejudice the taking of other 
lawful means to bring about the invocation of responsibility by states other 
than the injured state as in case of Article 48. This means that states are 
free to take any lawful actions, individually or collectively, either through 
an international organisation or as a coalition, to put pressure on the 
responsible state for a cessation of the wrongful act and for reparations to 
the injured state.60 
 
The Commentaries argue that the actions envisaged in Article 48 § 2 can 
only be taken on behalf of the injured state, especially with regard to the 
                                               
58 See, for a more detailed discussion on countermeasures and reparations in the 
Draft Articles, D. ALLAND, “Countermeasures of General Interest”, European 
Journal of International Law, 2002, pp. 1221-1239; D.J. BEDERMAN, 
“Counterintuiting Countermeasures”, American Journal of International Law, 2002, pp. 
817-832; D. SHELTON, “Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State 
Responsibility”, American Journal of International Law, 2002, pp. 833-855. 
59 See D. ALLAND, “Countermeasures of General Interest”, supra note 58, pp. 1126-
1233. 
60 The Commentaries give a number of examples where states have acted collectively 
in this manner but still concludes that the practices is embryonic to be deemed as 
reaching the status of customary law; see International Law Commission, 
Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, Article 54, §§ 2-4.  
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request for reparations, and in certain instances the state making such a 
claim might be requested to show that it is acting in the interest of the 
injured party.61 It is important that states are authorised to invoke the 
responsibility of a state when there is no directly injured state, especially 
when a norm requiring an erga omnes obligation is breached. This is because 
of the fact that in such instances, it is theoretically possible that there will 
be no single state authorised to call for the cessation of the wrongful act by 
the responsible state and the act would continue. This is particularly true 
for obligations that are of such importance that they are owed to the 
international community as a whole. It has been noted,62 though, that 
because other measures under Article 54 have been limited to only lawful 
means countermeasures are precluded under the Draft Articles. This is 
because countermeasures are by definition unlawful acts if adopted 
without prior commitment of a wrongful act of the state against which the 
countermeasures are taken. At this point, I would like to summarise the 
argument by quoting the Commentaries to the Draft Articles: 
 
“The current state of international law on countermeasures taken in 
the general or collective interest is uncertain. State practice is sparse 
and involves a limited number of states. At present there appears to 
be no clearly recognised entitlement of states referred to in Article 
48 to take countermeasures in the collective interest. Consequently 
it is not appropriate to include in the present Articles a provision 
concerning the question whether other states, identified in Article 
48, are permitted to take countermeasures in order to induce a 
responsible state to comply with its obligations. Instead Chapter II 
includes a saving clause which reserves the position and leaves the 
resolution of the matter to the further development of international 
law”.63 
 
4. The idea of communitarianism in the Draft Articles  
The concept of responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts in 
its initial historical conception it was inherently bilateral as were most 
relations among states. Even though multilateral agreements did exist they 
were seen as nothing more than a bundle of bilateral agreements.64 On the 
                                               
61 Ibid., Article 48, § 12.  
62 See D. ALLAND, “Countermeasures of General Interest”, supra note 58. 
63 It is worth noting that the Commentaries do mention a significant number of 
instances where states have acted collectively in response to breaches of ius cogens; see 
International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 54, § 6. 
64 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 42, § 8; which state that, “although a multilateral treaty will characteristically 
establish a framework of rules applicable to all the states parties, in certain cases its 
27  European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.2 No.1 
 
other hand, after World War II, the setting of international law - and the 
international system as a whole- began to change; we can no longer talk 
about international relations in the typical sense, but rather of trans-
national relations.65 In this trans-national world, the interactions in the 
international arena are no longer carried out by governments alone, 
through their organs for foreign affairs or by international organisations, 
but more and more between groups of individuals, NGOs, multinational 
companies, unions, guilds and professional societies, independent agencies 
and individuals themselves. The international system has moved from the 
concept of billiard balls to the concept of the spider’s web, where the 
interactions between individuals grow at an impressive rate. The world has 
become more globalised, as well as more fragmented, and a sense of a 
world community is more and more evident.  
 
These changes have found their way into the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility. Articles 40, 41, 48 and 54, recognise the importance of the 
values that ius cogens norms protect and, consequently, create the 
obligation for states, even those who are not directly affected by the 
breach, to cooperate in order to bring about its end and to counter its 
effects.66 Furthermore, the Draft Articles prescribe the negative obligation 
of not recognising the situation arising from the breach of a ius cogens norm 
and the obligation not to take positive steps like aiding and assisting in 
perpetuating the situation created by the breach.  
 
The Draft Articles also give effect to the notion of obligations erga omnes, 
obligations that are owed to the international community of states as a 
whole, because it is recognised that every member of that community has a 
legal interest in the performance of these types of obligations. It does so 
by allowing for every member of that community to call on the responsible 
state to be accountable. Every state can call on the responsible state to 
cease the wrongful act, to continue its normal and lawful conduct and to 
give appropriate reparations for the damages caused. Although the Draft 
Articles do not speak of countermeasures of general interest, whether 
taken collectively or by individually concerned states, they do not exclude 
them either. This is because their practice is still not sufficient for it to 
                                                                                                                                
performance in a given situation involves a relationship of a bilateral character 
between two parties” and that “multilateral treaties of this kind have often been 
referred to as giving rise to bundles of bilateral relations”.  
65 See, about the concept of trans-national relations, H.H. KOH, “Why Do Nations 
Obey International Law”, Yale Law Journal, 1997, pp. 2599-2659; L.R. HELFER and 
A.-M. SLAUGHTER, “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication”, 
supra note 45. 
66 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 41, § 3.  
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have crystallised into customary international law, and thus allowing in the 
future for individual states to take the cause of the international 
community when a breach of a ius cogens or erga omnes norm would occur.  
 
III. A SHORT DISCUSSION OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION  
 
1. Overview of the concept 
One of the first difficulties presented when discussing universal 
jurisdiction is the problem of its definition. When discussing universal 
jurisdiction judges and scholars have referred to it as a “true”, “classical”, 
“pure”, universal jurisdiction “properly so called” and so on. The ad hoc 
judge, Van den Wyngaert, in the Arrest Warrant Case concluded that “there 
is no generally accepted definition of universal jurisdiction in conventional 
or customary law; states that have incorporated that principle in their 
domestic legislation have done so in a very different way”.67 Both scholars 
and judges have used different terms from ‘true’, ‘proper’ and ‘pure’ 
universal jurisdiction, to using a narrower term like universal jurisdiction in 
absentia68  as a separate concept. The term ‘universal jurisdiction’ itself 
implies that what is understood to be the subject of its discussion is the 
jurisdiction of states. Under public international law, there are two types 
of jurisdiction that a state may have; one is the jurisdiction to prescribe 
and the other is the jurisdiction to enforce.69 Since this discussion is about 
criminal law the discussion below is limited to criminal jurisdiction 
exercised by states.  
 
Jurisdiction to prescribe means that a state can prescribe a certain conduct 
by groups or individuals as criminal, either by statutory acts, executive 
orders or judicial decisions; to state what the mens rea and the actus reus of 
the crime is and prescribe penalties for it. What conduct is deemed 
criminal is generally left to the discretion of the states themselves.70 On 
the other hand, a jurisdiction to enforce means that a state can take 
actions directed to enforcing the laws it has enacted. This can be executed 
through various different kinds of organs, most notably through its police 
forces and judicial bodies.71 These are separate kinds of jurisdictions and, 
although they are intertwined -that is to say, a state cannot have a 
jurisdiction to enforce if it first did not prescribe that conduct as criminal-, 
                                               
67 I.C.J., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 [DRC v. Belgium], 14 Feb. 2002, VAN DEN 
WYNGAERT, Dissenting Opinion, § 44. 
68  See ibid., GUILLAUME, Separate Opinion; HIGGINS, KOOIJMANS and 
BUERGENTHAL, Joint Separate Opinion. 
69 See R. O’KEEFE, “Universal Jurisdiction; Clarifying the Basic Concept”, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2004, pp. 735-760, at p. 736.  
70 Ibid., p. 737.  
71 Ibid. 
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they have to be kept apart when discussing them, since their use in similar 
situations can have different consequences under international law. 
Namely, the exercise of the jurisdiction to enforce on the territory of 
another state, without that state’s express permission, is contrary to 
international law. This is best summarised in the dictum of the Permanent 
Court International Justice (henceforth, “PCIJ”) in the Lotus Case. The 
Lotus standard is given by the majority decision, which reads that: 
 
“[International law] far from laying down a general prohibition to 
the effect that states may not extend the application of their laws 
and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts 
outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure 
of discretion, which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive 
rules; as regards to other cases, every state remains free to adopt the 
principles which it regards as best and most suitable”.72 
 
But, in order for a state to have wrongfully conferred upon itself 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, a rule of public international law must be 
shown to exist barring that specific kind of jurisdiction. And the court in 
the preceding paragraphs found one such prohibition, namely: 
 
“The first and foremost restriction imposed by international law 
upon a state is that -failing the existence of a permissive rule to the 
contrary- it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory 
of another state. In this sense, jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it 
cannot be exercised by a state outside its territory except by virtue 
of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a 
convention”.73 
 
States can prescribe their jurisdiction under several ‘heads’ or ‘titles’ which 
give the specific conduct in question a link to the state itself and therefore 
generally shows the underlying interest of that state to prosecute that 
conduct. These titles are: the territoriality principle, the nationality 
principle, the passive personality principle, the protective principle and the 
universality principle.74 The doctrine of effect has also been used by several 
states to define their jurisdiction. The latter five principles are also known 
as extraterritoriality principles. 
 
The most widely-used kind of jurisdiction is the territorial jurisdiction. 
                                               
72 P.C.I.J., S.S. ‘Lotus’ [France v Turkey], 7 Sept. 1927, Series A, Vol. 10, p. 19. 
73 Ibid.   
74 See M.N. SHAW, International Law, 5th ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2003, p. 579; R. O’KEEFE, “Universal Jurisdiction”, supra note 69, p. 736.  
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This jurisdiction means that a state can prescribe and prosecute a crime 
that has been committed on the territory of that state. In the term 
‘territory of a state’, aircraft and sea vessels that use that state’s flag are 
included. A crime does not have to be completely perpetrated on the 
territory of the state for it to have jurisdiction. A crime can be started in 
the territory of one state and be finished in another, the most typical 
example being when a person fires a gun across the border from one state 
into another and kills a person on the other side. The act was started on 
the territory of one state but was finished on the territory of another. In 
this case, under the territoriality principle, both states have the 
jurisdiction over that crime. The territoriality principle is the most widely 
used because the state has the most clear link with the crime; it has the 
general responsibility over the conduct of law on its soil, the evidence and 
witnesses are on its territory as well as the victims of the crime. The 
vindication of the victimised individual or group is also best accomplished 
by territorial jurisdiction.75 
 
The nationality principle is an extraterritorial one, meaning that it is 
mostly used when a national of that state commits a crime outside the 
territory of the individual’s state. In this case the state of which the 
individual is a national can prosecute her. This principle has been largely 
part of the continental law systems, but it is not unknown in Common 
Law systems for the most serious crimes, such as murder or treason. This 
principle is used because of the special link that an individual has with her 
state through her nationality. A further argument is that, in some 
instances, states have clauses for non-extradition of nationals to other 
states in their constitutions and when an individual tries to escape justice 
by seeking refuge in her own state, the state of nationality can prosecute 
her in the interest of justice.76 
 
The passive personality principle means that a state can have jurisdiction 
over a crime that has been committed abroad against one of its nationals. 
This is a rarely used concept and has been controversial in the past.77 
Today, as it has been said by judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
in the Arrest Warrant Case, this principle “meets with relatively little 
opposition, at least so far as a particular category of offences is 
                                               
75 See M.N. SHAW, International Law, supra note 74, pp. 579-584; R. O’KEEFE, 
“Universal Jurisdiction”, supra note 69, p. 737. 
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31  European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.2 No.1 
 
concerned”.78 
 
The protective principle allows for a state to prescribe and prosecute a 
crime that has been committed abroad by an individual who is not a 
national. The rationale behind this is that because the crime in question 
affects the vital national interests of the state, it can prosecute it. A prime 
example for this is counterfeiting the currency of a state, which is widely 
considered as a crime that falls under the protective principle because 
counterfeiting of the national currency, cumulatively taken, can subvert 
the national economy. The crime of treason is also another good example 
of this principle since the act is done against the national security interests 
of the state. The protective principle is combined with the effects doctrine 
which means that if a conduct can have an adverse effect in the territory of 
a state, the state can criminalise that conduct, like attempted smuggling of 
narcotics into the territory of a state. In this example, even though the 
crime was not committed on the territory of the prosecuting state or by its 
nationals and its nationals are not yet victims, the negative effect that 
narcotics can have motivates the state to protect itself. The effects 
doctrine is mostly used in matters when prescribing immigration laws and 
economic offences and has most recently been used by the United States 
and the European Union in their antitrust legislations.79 
 
The final principle which has been used by states to prescribe a conduct as 
criminal is the universality principle, which is the partial topic of this 
paper. This principle means that a state can assert jurisdiction over a crime 
that does not have any of the above-mentioned links to it. The crime could 
have been committed on the territory of another state by an individual 
that is not a national of that state, against an individual that is also not its 
national and that does not have a dilatory effect on its territory, but under 
the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, the state can still exercise 
jurisdiction over that crime.80 
 
In order to further clarify my point, since, as we have seen, different terms 
are used for the concept of universal jurisdiction, I will define ‘universal 
jurisdiction’ -for the purposes of this paper- as the jurisdiction of states to 
prescribe and prosecute a certain conduct that is directed against 
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international norms, values and interests that are deemed to be vital to the 
community of nations so as to entail universal condemnation as a criminal 
conduct without any other links to the state prescribing it. This definition 
offers a combination of two different elements, one that has been put 
forward by the 2001 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, which 
define universal jurisdiction as criminal jurisdiction based solely on the 
nature of the crime.81 According to the Princeton Principles, the specific 
heinousness of the crime is what warrants universal jurisdiction over that 
crime.82 I argue that the heinousness of a crime is not a specific enough 
term for a definition since a murder in most cases is heinous, but it is not 
something that we associate with universal jurisdiction.83  Therefore, I 
would introduce a second element, brought forward by Theodor Meron; 
namely, that “these are […] offences that are recognised by the community 
of nations as of universal concern, and as subject to universal 
condemnation”.84 The fact that the crime that is committed is directed at 
the values and interests that are vital to the community of nations as a 
whole is the element that should define these crimes as falling under 
universal jurisdiction. 
 
2. Universal jurisdiction but for what crimes? 
As the Lotus Case shows, unless a prohibitive rule of international law 
exists, states are generally free to prescribe their jurisdiction in a manner 
that they see fit and for crimes which they deem fit. After saying this, it 
seems unnecessary to go into any great length as to why states should stop 
only for a certain number of crimes; and if they should then why only for 
those and not others. This is not the specific topic of this paper, but 
suffice it to say that one good reason why states stop at a small number of 
crimes is strictly prudential: if states prescribe universal jurisdiction for 
every crime in their criminal codes they would never be able to handle all 
the cases that come up in the world. A second reason is the fact that not 
                                               
81 2001 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, Principle 1 § 1, p. 28; which states 
that, “for the purposes of these Principles, universal jurisdiction is criminal 
jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the 
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all crimes are recognised as international crimes. Because of the limits of 
this paper, I will use the list of crimes that has been put forward by the 
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction as an authoritative one and 
point the reader in that direction for a good discussion on the issue. In this 
part of the paper, I will deal with the nature of the crimes and their 
peremptory status in international law.  
 
The Princeton Principles list the following crimes: piracy, slavery, war crimes, 
crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture.85 This 
list is ordered according to historical progression and in no way should it 
be construed as indicating any preference of one crime over another in 
terms of their gravity.86 One can deduct several commonalities that have 
been discussed in the literature in connection with these crimes.87 The first 
common characteristic is that they are all general rules of international law 
of a customary nature and, therefore, obligatory to all states. Except for 
crimes against humanity all of the crimes are set down in international 
treaties which have crystallised into custom or have been codified from 
custom to treaty.88 But, this only means that states are obligated to prevent 
or prosecute the commission of these acts and does not say what 
jurisdiction should be awarded for them. These rules are of a substantive 
law nature; they define the conduct that is criminalised and prescribe the 
criminal responsibility of the individual that commits them. What these 
rules do not do is settle the issue of jurisdiction of states when it comes to 
the obligation to prosecute. The narrowest obligation that arises for states 
from this is to prescribe the conduct as criminal in their domestic laws and 
prosecute these crimes if they are committed on their territory. 
Furthermore, these norms deal with the responsibility of individuals and 
not of states, although they do prescribe certain obligation on states like 
the obligation to prosecute if they are committed on their territory. 
 
The second common characteristic of these crimes is the fact that they have 
been recognised by courts or scholars as being peremptory norms of 
international law or ius cogens. The concept of ‘ius cogens’ saw its first 
codification in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which stipulates that:  
 
“Article 53 - Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general 
                                               
85 2001 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, Principle 2 § 1.  
86 Ibid., p. 45.  
87 See E. KONTOROVICH, “The Piracy Analogy”, supra note 83.  
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international law: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of 
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international 
law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international 
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation 
is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm 
of general international law having the same character”. 
 
But the idea of ius cogens itself goes back longer than the drafting history of 
the Vienna Convention. The idea came to be discussed in the late 1930s, as 
Verdross wrote his article on Forbidden Treaties in International Law,89 
forwarding the notion that there are certain treaties that should not be 
recognised or enforced by international tribunals because they are contra 
bonos mores or against good morals.90 He found the source of ius cogens in 
the general principles of law that are common to all nations. He argued 
that all nations, democratic or totalitarian, restrict the freedom of contract 
in domestic law by declaring all contracts or agreements that are against 
the good morals of the given society null and void. He also gives examples 
of nations and provisions.91 He later goes on to give four examples of 
treaties that would be against the good morals of international society.92 
 
The outbreak of WW II tabled the discussion for some better time in the 
future, but this was not for long. The concept was briefly re-visited by 
Humphrey in 1945, arguing that the development of international relations 
has produced an international society; and where there is a society there is 
law -ubi societas ibi ius- and some of that law protects the core values of that 
society and therefore has priority. 93  The notion that international 
agreements can be found as producing no legal effect because they are 
against the good morals of a society, was recognised in a brief reference in 
a decision of the Military Tribunal in Nuremberg under Control Council 
Law No 10 in the case of United States v. Krupp. The Tribunal said that 
even if there were a treaty that authorised French prisoners of war to be 
used in the German armaments industry, those treaties would be void 
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Professor Garner’s Report on ‘The Law of Treaties’”, American Journal of International 
Law, 1937, pp. 571-577. 
90 Ibid,, p. 572. 
91 Ibid., pp. 573-574.  
92 Ibid., pp. 574-576. 
93 See J.P. HUMPHREY, “On the Foundations of International Law”, American 
Journal of International Law, 1945, pp. 231-243.  
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under international law as contraire aux bonnes moeurs.94 
 
The debate about the concept of ‘ius cogens’ has been continuing in various 
different forums with certain authors giving reasons for,95 and others giving 
reasons against the concept or its dangers and its futility.96 One of the 
points of contention about ius cogens norms is their source. Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention states that peremptory norms are norms “accepted 
and recognised by the international community of states as a whole” and 
therefore puts the source of peremptory norms in the consent of states. 
Others put the source of ius cogens norms in natural law, international 
public order, or general principles of international law.97 If the source of ius 
cogens is derived from consent of states, then their applicability is limited 
only to the law on treaties with regard to the validity and applicability of 
treaties. For those who see the sources of ius cogens norms in public order, 
peremptory norms are there to protect the highest values of the 
community of states and, therefore, are of a higher level in the hierarchy of 
norms. They also radiate their effect beyond treaty law and can be used in 
the sphere of the other two sources of international law, which are 
customs and general principles of international law. As the ad hoc judge 
Dugard puts it in his separate opinion in the Armed Activities on the 
                                               
94 See D. SHELTON, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law”, American Journal 
of International Law, 2006, pp. 291-323.  
95 See A. VERDROSS, “Ius Dispositivum and Ius Cogens in International Law”, 
American Journal of International Law, 1966, pp. 55-63; C.A. FORD, “Adjudicating Ius 
Cogens”, Wisconsin International Law Journal, 1994, pp. 145-181; D.S. MITCHELL, 
“The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Ius 
Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine”, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 
2005, pp. 219-257; D. SHELTON, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law”, supra 
note 94; E.M. KORNICKER UHLMANN, “State Community Interests, Ius 
Cogens and Protection of the Global Environment: Developing Criteria For 
Peremptory Norms”, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 1998, pp. 
101-135; J.I. CHARNEY, “Universal International Law”, American Journal of 
International Law, 1993, pp. 529-551.  
96  See A.M. WEISBURD, “The Emptiness of the Concept of Ius Cogens, as 
Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 
1995, pp. 1-51; C. KAHGAN, “Ius Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-Defence”, 
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, 1997, pp. 767-827; G. 
SCHWARZENBERGER, “International Ius Cogens?”, Texas Law Review, 1964-
1965, pp. 455-478; P. WEIL, “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law”, 
American Journal of International Law, 1983, pp. 413-442; see also, for a more detailed 
discussion, D. SHELTON, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law”, supra note 
94.  
97 See D. SHELTON, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law”, supra note 94, 
pp. 300-302.  
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Territory of the Congo Case,98 
 
“Norms of ius cogens are a blend of principle and policy. On the one hand, 
they affirm the high principles of international law, which recognise the 
most important rights of the international order – such as the right to be 
free from aggression, genocide, torture and slavery and the right to self-
determination; while, on the other hand, they give legal form to the most 
fundamental policies or goals of the international community – the 
prohibitions on aggression, genocide, torture and slavery and the 
advancement of self-determination. This explains why they enjoy a 
hierarchical superiority to other norms in the international legal order. 
The fact that norms of ius cogens advance both principle and policy means 
that they must inevitably play a dominant role in the process of judicial 
choice”.99 
 
The concept of ‘ius cogens’ as defined in Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention has two major components: first, that it is a superior norm in 
terms of hierarchy to all other norms of international law that are not of 
the same stature; and, secondly, in order to produce such an effect it has to 
be recognised as such by the international community of states as a whole. 
Decisions of international tribunals give some clues as to the first 
consequences, although the use varies from tribunal to tribunal.  
 
The ICJ for instance has tried to settle the issues brought before it 
without the help of ius cogens. In the Nicaragua Case, the Court pronounced 
the prohibition of aggression as a ius cogens norm only as an extra argument 
in its decision of why to continue with the case, despite the stark 
objections raised by the United States. It did not elaborate any further on 
what the consequences of ius cogens norms are or how one can identify 
them. In another decision on Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 
the ICJ went into more detail on their consequences. The Court remained 
very cautious of using ius cogens norms to trump other norms of 
international law. In the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Case, 
the ICJ, although finding that the crime of genocide set out in the 
Genocide Convention is of a peremptory character, decided that its ius 
cogens nature is only with regard to the substantive provisions of the 
Genocide Convention and it does not apply to the provisions on 
jurisdictional issues. Thus, it could be said that it is similar to the notion 
that reservations are allowed for provisions of a treaty that are not against 
its object and purpose and the jurisdictional clauses are not the object or 
                                               
98 I.C.J., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo [DRC v. Rwanda], 3 Feb. 2006, § 
64.  
99 Ibid., DUGARD, Separate Opinion, § 10. 
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the purpose of the Convention. Thus, the reservation that Rwanda made 
when it acceded to the Genocide Convention with regard to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in disputes arising out of the Genocide 
Convention cannot be overridden by the ius cogens nature of the crime of 
genocide.100 
 
The Court seems to leave some room for manoeuvre by saying that a 
peremptory rules of international law do not exist in terms of the 
provisions of Article 9,101 which deals with the jurisdiction of the ICJ in 
relation to disputes arising from the Genocide Convention. Therefore, 
reservations to Article 9 do not go against the ius cogens nature of the 
norms in the Genocide Convention. 102  Future developments seem to 
depend on how narrow the Court or other bodies interpret the case law of 
the ICJ. Hopefully, the ICJ or other courts in their future judgments will 
interpret the decision in the case so as to mean that it is only related to the 
rules that govern the jurisdiction of the ICJ as just another forum for 
settling disputes between states. The is the first majority opinion in which 
the Court specifically enters into a discussion on the issue of peremptory 
norms and hopefully the Court will have more courage in its next decisions 
when expanding on this concept, However, for the moment, the 
conclusion stands that the ICJ seems reluctant to use the concept of 
peremptory norms to trump over clearly established concepts like, the 
consensual character of the jurisdiction of the ICJ.103 
                                               
100 I.C.J., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo [DRC v. Rwanda], 3 Feb. 2006, § 
67; which states that “Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide 
Convention bears on the jurisdiction of the Court, and does not affect substantive 
obligations relating to acts of genocide themselves under that Convention; in the 
circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot conclude that the reservation of 
Rwanda in question, which is meant to exclude a particular method of settling a 
dispute relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, is 
to be regarded as being incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
Convention”. 
101 Article 9 of the Genocide Convention confers jurisdiction to the ICJ on any 
disputes including responsibility for genocide by any state. Disputes between the 
contracting parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the 
present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a state for 
genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to 
the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.  
102 Ibid., § 69; which states that “in so far as the DRC contended further that 
Rwanda’s reservation is in conflict with a peremptory norm of general international 
law, it suffices for the Court to note that no such norm presently exists requiring a 
state to consent to the jurisdiction of the Court in order to settle a dispute relating 
to the Genocide Convention; Rwanda’s reservation cannot therefore, on such 
grounds, be regarded as lacking legal effect”. 
103 Ibid., DUGARD, Separate Opinion, §§ 13-14; who states that “in the present case, 
the Court is confronted with a very different situation; the Court is not asked, in the 
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Other international tribunals have also very rarely used the concept of ‘ius 
cogens’. Tribunals that are likely to come across the concept are tribunals 
that deal with human rights issues like, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (ACHR) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). These tribunals have made decisions 
concerning ius cogens in different issues. For example, the ECHR, in the 
case of Al-Adsani v. UK,104 did not use the ius cogens character of the 
prohibition of torture to override the issue of state immunity in civil 
matters. The Court did not find a violation of Article 6 -i.e., access to 
courts-, when the UK denied standing to Al-Adsani to sue Kuwait for 
damages arising out of torture. For the Court, even though the prohibition 
against torture has risen to the status of peremptory norm, it still does not 
trump over immunities ratione personae of states in civil matters, while at 
the same time not awarding the same status of ius cogens to these 
immunities.105 This case was decided by a very narrow majority, nine votes 
to eight, and the dissenters had their say in the matter. They clearly 
recognised the full effect of the concept of ius cogens and its overriding 
consequence to norms that are not of the same stature. More importantly, 
in my view, the dissenters put the source and the purpose of ius cogens in 
“ordre public; that is, the basic values of the international community, 
[which] cannot be subject to unilateral or contractual forms of derogation 
from their imperative contents”. 106  In the words of the dissenting 
members:  
 
“Due to the interplay of the ius cogens rule on prohibition of torture 
and the rules on state immunity, the procedural bar of state 
                                                                                                                                
exercise of its legitimate judicial function, to exercise its choice between competing 
sources in a manner which gives effect to a norm of ius cogens; on the contrary, it is 
asked to overthrow an established principle -that the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction 
is consent- which is founded in its Statute (Article 36), endorsed by unqualified state 
practice and backed by opinio juris; it is, in effect, asked to invoke a peremptory norm 
to trump a norm of general international law accepted and recognised by the 
international community of states as a whole, and which has guided the Court for 
over 80 years; this is a bridge too far [...]; for this reason the Court, in the present 
instance, has rightly held that although norms of ius cogens are to be recognised by the 
Court, and presumably to be invoked by the Court in future in the exercise of its 
judicial function, there are limits to be placed on the role of ius cogens; the request to 
overthrow the principle of consent as the basis for its jurisdiction goes beyond these 
limits; this, in effect, is what the Court has held”.  
104 E.C.H.R., Al-Adsani v. UK, 21 Nov. 2001, Reports, 2001, XI, § 55.  
105 Ibid., §§ 62-66.  
106 Ibid., ROZAKIS, CAFLISCH, WILDHABER, COSTA, CABRAL BARRETO 
and VAJIC, Joint Dissenting Opinion, § 2.  
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immunity is automatically lifted, because those rules, as they conflict 
with a hierarchically higher rule, do not produce any legal effect. In 
the same vein, national law which is designed to give domestic effect 
to the international rules on state immunity cannot be invoked as 
creating a jurisdictional bar, but must be interpreted in accordance 
with and in the light of the imperative precepts of ius cogens”.107 
 
Other courts have used ius cogens in other ways. For instance, it can be said 
that the ICTY, in the Furundzija Case,108 made an intellectual exercise 
when it went on to find that the prohibition of torture is a peremptory 
norm of international law, since its findings did not have any effect on the 
case at hand. The pronouncement that the prohibition of torture is a ius 
cogens norm would not make the guilt of Anto Furundzija any greater under 
the ICTY Statute. Nor would it help in putting aside the fair trial 
provisions for a more certain and a speedier conviction. Nevertheless, the 
Tribunal continued discussing at length the practical implications of ius 
cogens norms on international and domestic norms and, when it comes to 
the issue of universal jurisdiction, it had to say that: 
 
“Furthermore, at the individual level, that is, that of criminal liability, it 
would seem that one of the consequences of the ius cogens character 
bestowed by the international community upon the prohibition of torture 
is that every state is entitled to investigate, prosecute and punish or 
extradite individuals accused of torture, who are present in a territory 
under its jurisdiction. Indeed, it would be inconsistent on the one hand to 
prohibit torture to such an extent as to restrict the normally unfettered 
treaty-making power of sovereign states, and on the other hand bar states 
from prosecuting and punishing those torturers who have engaged in this 
odious practice abroad. This legal basis for states’ universal jurisdiction 
over torture bears out and strengthens the legal foundation for such 
jurisdiction found by other courts in the inherently universal character of 
the crime”.109 
 
The ECJ, on the other hand, has used ius cogens in order to strengthen its 
somewhat controversial -and, in some circles, unpopular- judgments. In 
the case of Kadi v. Council,110 the ECJ used the concept of ius cogens to imply 
that it can review the legality of a Security Council resolution regarding the 
seizure of funds of suspected supporters of terrorists, because it may 
conflict with the fundamental rights of the human person, which have 
                                               
107 Ibid., § 3.  
108 I.C.T.Y., Furundzija Case (Lasva Valley), IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, 10 Dec. 1998. 
109 Ibid., § 156. 
110 E.C.J., T-253/02, Kadi v. Council, 2006/C 224/73.  
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attained peremptory status. It said that “the Court is empowered to check, 
indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the Security Council in 
question with regard to ius cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of 
public international law binding on all subjects of international law, 
including the bodies of the United Nations, and from which no derogation 
is possible”.111 
 
Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has used the 
concept of ius cogens to strengthen its somewhat controversial advisory 
opinion on the rights of undocumented migrants.112 In this case, the Court 
noted that non-discrimination has attained the status of a peremptory 
norm and that it produced certain effects, and that:  
 
“In its development and by its definition, ius cogens is not limited to 
treaty law. The sphere of ius cogens has expanded to encompass 
general international law, including all legal acts. Ius cogens has also 
emerged in the law of the international responsibility of states and, 
finally, has had an influence on the basic principles of the 
international legal order”.113 
 
The brief case reference in this part of the paper suggests that courts rarely 
use the concept of ius cogens and that they all recognise that in theory they 
trump other norms of international law that are not of the same stature. 
But as we have seen in the cases of the ICJ and the ECHR, these courts 
are not willing to use ius cogens to override fairly established rules of 
international law, like the consensual nature of the jurisdiction of the ICJ 
and state immunity in civil matters. On the other hand, the ECJ and the 
ACHR used ius cogens as an extra argument in their reasoning for their 
somewhat controversial decisions. But, one notion for our paper is very 
important, and that is the fact that the concept of ius cogens norms has, in 
the words of the ACHR, permeated in other regimes of international law 
beyond the realm of the laws of treaties and can be now used as a yardstick 
for other concepts and all acts of states.114 
 
The second implication given by the definition of ius cogens in the Vienna 
Convention is the questions of how we can recognise a norm of ius cogens, 
what are the criteria for it achieving such a status? A small help is given in 
the words “recognised by the international community of states as a 
                                               
111 Ibid,, § 226.  
112 A.C.H.R., Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Adv. Op. OC-18/03, 17 
Sept. 2003, Series A, Vol. 18. 
113 Ibid,, § 99.  
114 Ibid.  
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whole”, but that does not give many tantalising clues as to what constitutes 
the ‘international community of states as a whole’ and where one can find 
that recognition.  
 
The ILC, in its commentaries to the Draft on the Law of Treaties, that 
later became the Vienna Convention, when elaborating on the concept of 
ius cogens, said that:  
 
“There is no simple criterion by which to identify a general rule of 
international law as having the character of ius cogens. Moreover, the 
majority of the general rules of international law do not have that 
character, and states may contract out of them by treaty. It would 
therefore be going much too far to state that a treaty is void if its 
provisions conflict with a rule of general international law. Nor 
would it be correct to say that a provision in a treaty possesses the 
character of ius cogens merely because the parties have stipulated that 
no derogation from that provision is to be permitted, so that 
another treaty which conflicted with that provision would be 
void”.115 
 
Ius cogens norms can arise from all sources of international law, custom, 
convention or general principle, and it is worth noting that “it is not the 
form of a general rule of international law but the particular nature of the 
subject-matter with which it deals that may […] give it the character of ius 
cogens”.116 But the criterion which is set out in Article 53 cannot be easily set 
aside. The requirement is that the norm is recognised as such by the 
international community of states as a whole. The question arises that if 
recognition of the entire community of states is needed, then does that 
mean that any member of that community has a right to veto the 
emergence of a ius cogens norm? One consequence of that sentence is that it 
is only states that can give rise to peremptory norms. Opinions and 
practices of international organisations do not count. This is inherent in 
the term ‘community of states’. Statements made at the Vienna conference 
on the Law of Treaties by state representatives give clues to the answer to 
this question. Every member of the international community does not 
have a veto power; rather a peremptory norm can come into existence if 
the essential members of the international community of states recognise 
it as such.117 
                                               
115 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Proposal on the Law of 
Treaties [reproduced in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II, § 2. 
116 Ibid.    
117 See D. SHELTON, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law”, supra note 94; 
E.M. KORNICKER UHLMANN, “State Community Interests, Ius Cogens and 
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A third common characteristic of these crimes is that their ius cogens 
character under international law cloaks them with obligations that are of 
an erga omnes nature. What that means is that the obligations in question 
are owed to every member of the international community as a whole and 
not just towards specifically determined or affected states. Every state has 
a legal interest in securing the performance of these obligations. A more 
detailed discussion on the consequences of erga omnes obligations is 
presented in the previous Part of this paper. The problem with erga omnes 
obligations is the fact that they have limited use. This has been revealed in 
the East Timor Case, where the ICJ said that the erga omnes character of a 
norm and the consent to jurisdiction of the ICJ are two separate issues and 
that because a norm is of an erga omens character it does not mean that the 
ICJ can rule on the lawfulness of a conduct of a state -in this case, 
Indonesia- that is not a party to the case.118 
 
IV. OVERLAP OF THESE CONCEPTS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
 
Traditionally, international law has been seen as an aggregate of norms 
that governs international relations. As an aggregate of norms it prescribes 
what states must not do, or prohibitive norms; what states must do, or 
prescriptive norms; and what they may do, or permissive norms.119 The 
system in which this aggregate of norms exists is a system of 
juxtapositioned states, which at times organise part of their endeavours in 
specific fields of interest through international organisations. The PCIJ 
summarised it best when it said that: 
 
“The rules of law binding upon states […] emanate from their own 
free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted 
as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate 
the relations between these co-existing independent communities or 
with a view to the achievement of common aims”.120 
 
A consequence of a system of the sovereign and equal states is a 
decentralised lawmaking process where there is no ultimate lawmaker who 
can decide what rule is a legal norm and what is a moral rule. A further 
consequence is that we cannot per se organise the system of norms in a 
specific hierarchy. If there is a hierarchy of norms then that hierarchy has 
                                                                                                                                
Protection of the Global Environment”, supra note 95, pp. 112-113; P. WEIL, 
“Towards Relative Normativity in International Law”, supra note 96, pp. 419-423.  
118 I.C.J., East Timor, 30 June 1995, § 29.  
119 P. WEIL, “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law”, supra note 96, p. 
413.  
120 P.C.I.J., S.S. ‘Lotus’, 7 Sept. 1927, p. 18.  
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to be consented to by all states. Even for a norm to be a norm of general 
international law, it has to be consented to by all states. Doing anything 
less would “blur the normative threshold”121 and would create confusion as 
to what constitutes law, what is a binding legal obligation and what is a 
moral one. At least, that was the traditional positivist view of international 
law.  
 
Today, the system of equal states is by and large still in existence, but with 
numerous distortions in its midst. We have regimes with supranational 
features that are flourishing, that are quite successful and are 
multiplying.122 We are no longer talking about international relations but 
of trans-national relations,123 where the interactions that cross the borders 
of nations are no longer dominated by interactions between states or states 
and private persons, but overwhelmingly, by private parties. Even the 
interactions between states on an official level is no longer exclusively done 
by their ministries of foreign affairs and today we have professional civil 
servants from different governmental departments, independent agencies, 
police departments, prosecutorial services and courts interacting with each 
other.  
 
The sense of an international community is more present than ever before. 
These three concepts -that is, ius cogens, invocation of the responsibility of 
states by other than the injured state(s) and universal jurisdiction- are at 
the forefront of it and it is no surprise that they are very much intertwined. 
The concept of ‘obligations erga omnes’ was recognised because of a sense 
that certain obligations, even though not specifically agreed upon, are 
common and shared by all states and that every state has an interest in 
their performance. These obligations are closely linked to core values of 
the international society -i.e., the peaceful coexistence of nations, the 
respect for human dignity and the human person-, core values that are of 
such importance that are elevated to norms of a higher and imperative 
level. If these norms are violated, then international law creates not only 
the responsibility of states, but of individuals as well, by creating 
international crimes and conferring individual criminal responsibility. One 
segment of enforcement of international crimes is universal jurisdiction, 
which again is a concept for the protection of communitarian interests.  
 
                                               
121 See P. WEIL, “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law”, supra note 
96. 
122 See, for more details, L.R. HELFER and A.-M. SLAUGHTER, “Toward a Theory 
of Effective Supranational Adjudication”, supra note 45; H.H. KOH, “Why do 
Nations Obey International Law”, supra note 65.  
123 H.H. KOH, “Trans-national Legal Process”, Nebraska Law Review, 1996, pp. 181-
207.  
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International crimes, at least those discussed in the Princeton Principles, 
are of a ius cogens nature. The ius cogens status of these crimes means that 
they trump over other norms of international law that are not of the same 
rank, like state immunity. Even the ECHR, in the Al-Adsani v. UK Case, 
confirmed that there is no state immunity in criminal matters, although 
they have confirmed it in civil matters ratione personae.124 Their execution is 
a serious breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm, which 
under Article 41 requires a communal response by all states -even those 
who are not directly affected by the breach- in order to bring an end to the 
breach and to counter its effects.125 States can take several steps on how to 
bring an end to a breach, but since we are talking here about international 
criminal law norms, one step would be to create an international tribunal 
like in the case of the ICTY, ICTR or the International Criminal Court. 
But states do not always respond adequately as a community and they 
often fail to respond at all because of political considerations. In such 
cases, can an individual state hoist up the banner of protecting the 
communal interests? I submit that the Draft Articles not only codify the 
obligation to cooperate, but also the obligation to take steps to stop the 
breach and to counter its effects. It seems logical that the obligation to 
cooperate would be useless if there was no prior obligation -or, at least, the 
possibility- of taking the measures to counter the effects of the breach 
individually. One can not be required to take measures collectively which 
one would not be required to take individually.  
 
Furthermore, the Draft Articles specifically authorise states to call to 
responsibility the responsible state even though they are not the injured 
state. And again, if we develop the concept and transplant it to the realm 
of individual criminal responsibility, then we can say that any state, 
although not directly affected by the breach, has an interest in preserving 
the performance of the obligation. Consequently, it can call on the 
perpetrator, be it a state -as per Article 48 of the Draft Articles- or an 
individual, to responsibility. As a consequence to the individual 
perpetrator, this would mean launching a criminal process against her. 
                                               
124 E.C.H.R., Al-Adsani v. UK, 21 Nov. 2001, § 65; which states that “the international 
prohibition against official torture had the character of ius cogens or a peremptory 
norm and that no immunity was enjoyed by a torturer from one Torture Convention 
state from the criminal jurisdiction of another; but, as the working group of the ILC 
itself acknowledged, that case concerned the immunity ratione materiae from criminal 
jurisdiction of a former head of state, who was at the material time physically within 
the United Kingdom; as the judgments in the case made clear, the conclusion of the 
House of Lords did not in any way affect the immunity ratione personae of foreign 
sovereign states from the civil jurisdiction in respect of such acts”.  
125 International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, 
Article 41, § 3.  
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Calling on the responsibility of an individual is a far smaller intrusion into 
the sovereignty of states than calling on its state responsibility. If the 
greater intrusion is authorised, then it is logical to conclude that the 
smaller one is as well.  
 
We now have to consider the objection that the ILC was silent on the 
issue of calling for the responsibility of individuals for international crimes. 
True the ILC did not consider the possibility of a state calling for the 
individual criminal responsibility for violations of international crimes, 
although they fall under the concept of ‘ius cogens’ as codified in the Draft 
Articles. The answer to this objection would be that it was not in the 
mandate of the ILC to consider this issue, because its mandate was limited 
to state responsibility and did not include individual criminal 
responsibility. But creating the obligation to respond to a serious breach of 
a peremptory norm is not limited to responding only to state actions 
causing the breach. There are no reasons why the observance of the 
mandate of the ILC by not discussing issues that were not on its agenda 
would prejudice this interpretation of the duty to respond and cooperate. 
We are well aware that today a great number of the breaches of ius cogens 
norms specifically protected by international criminal law are carried out 
by non-state actors. It would be silly to think that, because there is no 
direct state involvement than states that are not directly affected by the 
breach cannot act to put a stop to the breach and counter its effects.  
 
Furthermore, the Draft Articles themselves do not preclude 
countermeasures of general interests or the taking of any lawful measures 
that are not mentioned in its Commentaries. Universal jurisdiction is a 
lawful measure that can be taken by a state in line with the Lotus standard; 
i.e., so long as it is not enforced on the territory of another state without 
that state’s consent. The lawful mechanism in question is the request for 
help in judicial matters, which is another example of cooperation in order 
to bring an end to the breach and to counter its effects. And let us 
remember that states are obliged to cooperate to that effect, which 
transplanted to individual responsibility would mean that states are obliged 
to give any assistance available to the prosecuting state. As we know, 
cooperation in judicial matters is normally carried out through bilateral 
treaties; extradition being the prime example. What I argue is that even in 
absence of bilateral treaty commitments of cooperation in judicial matters, 
the duty to cooperate would extend to all states and that they would be 
obligated to respond favourably to any request for assistance by the 
prosecuting state.  
 
The ius cogens nature of these crimes, furthermore, would give them the 
possibility to trump over other norms of international law and even 
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domestic law. One such norm that was specifically recognised to be 
overridden by another ius cogens norm was the immunity ratione materiae of 
heads of states in the Pinochet Case,126 later confirmed in the ECHR’s Al-
Adsani v. UK judgment.127 Although the ICJ did not want to use ius cogens 
to trump fairly established rules of international law, like the consensual 
character of its jurisdiction, it nevertheless narrowed its decision. It went 
on to say that the reasons for not using the overriding characteristic of 
peremptory norms is because the ius cogens provisions of the Genocide 
Convention are only related to the substantive part of the crime and not to 
the dispute resolution mechanisms in the Convention, like Article 9.128 
 
In order to better explain the concept, I will present a hypothetical case 
scenario. Let us imagine that in state A there is a civil conflict based on 
ethnic hatred. A rebel group created on an ethnic basis has seized territory 
where the majority of that ethnic group resides. It launches attacks from 
that territory on the civilian population not of its ethnic group in the rest 
of state A. The attacks can be qualified as crimes against humanity. The 
government of state A is trying to fight off the attacks, but it is not able to 
control its entire territory. State A is not a party to the Rome Statute and 
the backing of one of the permanent members of the UNSC is halting any 
reference by the Council to the ICC or any other collective action through 
the UN mechanisms. 
 
In situations like these, although there has been a breach of a ius cogens 
norm, that breach cannot be attributed to state A and, consequently, other 
states cannot call for its international responsibility.129 Nevertheless, the 
breach itself triggers the duty of states other than state A -since, in this 
case, it is the one that is directly affected by the breach- to cooperate in 
order to bring an end to the breach and to counter its effects.130 In this 
scenario, the cooperative endeavour is not feasible because of the 
insurgent group’s support by a permanent member of the UNSC with veto 
powers. However, this does not mitigate the duty of other states to try to 
bring an end to the breach or counter its effects.  
 
Let us now say that state B is shocked by the atrocities committed during 
the conflict. It has the financial and other resources to prosecute the 
                                               
126 House of Lords, R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex 
parte Pinochet Ugarte, 1 AC 61; 1 AC 147; 2 All ER 97; 2 WLR 827. 
127 E.C.H.R., Al-Adsani v. UK, 21 Nov. 2001, §§ 60-62. 
128 See discussion supra note 100.  
129 See International Law Commission, 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 21, Article 10 § 
2.  
130 International Law Commission, 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 21, Article 41 § 1; 
Commentaries to the Draft Articles, supra note 14, §§ 2-3.  
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individuals it deems responsible and its law on criminal procedure has 
proscribed universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity. As we by 
now know, the Lotus standard allows state B to prescribe such jurisdiction, 
so long as it does not attempt to enforce it on the territory of another 
state without that state’s permission. It is presumed that the judicial 
system in state B satisfies the standards of fair trial procedures enshrined 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights. And now let us also assume that 
one of the leaders of the insurgent group has fled state A and is seeking 
asylum in state C. State B feels that it has sufficient evidence to launch a 
case against the insurgent leader and files an extradition request with state 
C.  
 
In this situation, state B has several arguments that it can use in order to 
persuade state C to cooperate and surrender the insurgent leader for trial. 
State B can argue that the positive obligations of Article 41 § 1 require 
state C to join in this prosecution. State B can argue that the prosecution 
has now become a cooperative effort in order to deter the further 
continuation of the breach and to counter its effects by restoring the 
balance of justice. It will say that the essence of the duty prescribed in 
Article 41 § 1 is focused on putting an end to the breach, not on calling 
other states to responsibility. It can further argue that the duty in Article 
41 § 2 extends to not giving support or safe haven to non-state actors and 
individuals and not just states, because it would amount to: first, the 
recognition of the legality of his actions; and, second, rendering assistance in 
maintaining the situation caused by the breach. In the case that state C 
has statutory provisions stating that a person that has applied for asylum 
cannot be extradited to a third country, state B can argue that the ius cogens 
nature of crimes against humanity would trump not only other 
international norms, but domestic laws of non-extradition as well.  
 
This situation is designed with the possibility of prosecuting non-state 
actors in mind, where their actions cannot be imputed to the state where 
the breach has occurred. But, there is no overwhelming reason why these 
obligations would not apply to other scenarios that would involve state 
actors. The obligations to take actions to put and end to a breach and to 
counter its effects have no limitations that they apply only when dealing 
with non-state actors. Quite to the contrary, they are designed to apply in 
terms of state responsibility, where state actors are, by definition, involved. 
Legally there are no compelling objections why this would not be so. The 
only objections are of a political or prudential nature131 and, although valid, 
they are not part of the examination in this paper.  
                                               
131 H.A. KISSINGER, “The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction”, supra note 3. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
 
As the Advisory Opinion on Undocumented Migrants suggests, the concept of 
‘ius cogens’ has extended beyond the realm of the laws of treaties where it 
was first codified and found its place in another codification of the ILC; 
namely, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. Consequently, the 
obligations that are created by these norms go beyond the law of treaties 
and now not only treaties can be null and void -that is, can be found not to 
produce legal effects- but also Security Council Resolutions and all other 
acts. Ius cogens norms produce the effect that if the obligations arising from 
them are breached then states are obliged to try to put an end to it and to 
counter its effects by taking lawful measures. More specifically, states are 
authorised to act in the community’s interest by calling on the 
international responsibility of the responsible state. The obligation to put 
an end and to counter the effects of a breach can also be said to transcend 
the barriers of state responsibility where it first found its place. One of the 
measures to put an end or to counter the breach which can be undertaken 
is universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction gives states the ability to 
prosecute the individuals responsible for that breach and if certain 
conditions are in place -for instance, the availability of the suspect-, this 
possibility should be used. This does not mean that the states prescribing 
universal jurisdiction can enforce it on the territory of another state 
without that state’s consent, because universal jurisdiction is not a 
substantive provision of these international crimes and has not risen to the 
status of ius cogens. Quite to the contrary, the sovereign equality of states is 
a ius cogens norm. But, because of the obligations of cooperation in the 
Draft Articles, other states would be obliged to give judicial assistance to 
the prosecuting state as a way of putting an end to the breach and 
countering its effects. 
 
